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"CARRYING THE BATTLE INTO THE FORM:" 1
REPATRIATING FIRST NATIONS' CULTURAL
ARTIFACTS
NATALIE CUKt

The healing of Canada's First Nations depends directly on their ability to reestablish control over their own cultures, to which cultural artifacts are
integrally related. Thus, the article is premised on First Nations having a
right to their cultural artifacts. To halt and reverse the exploitation of
Aboriginal peoples, cultural artifacts displayed in museums and nonAboriginal public institutions must be repatriated to the First Nations source
groups. The article assesses both legal and non-legal methods for repatriation.
The author suggests that a declaration of the existence of an Aboriginal right
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is the best way to initiate
the flow of repatriation immediately. It is proposed that, in time, methods for
ensuring cultural restoration can move beyond the legal ftamewor!? and
eventually be based on mutual agreement.
La consolidation des premieres Nations au Canada dependera directement sur
leur capacite de reprendre le controle de leur proper culture, dont les objets
culturels font partie integrale. Done, ce travail est base sur le principe selon
lequel les premieres Nations ont des droits envers ces objets culturels. Pour
cesser !'exploitation des Autochtones et pour la mettre en marche arriere, les
objets culturels exposes dans les musees et dans les institutions publiques nonAutochtone doivent etre rapatries par les premieres Nations. Ce travail
analyse a la fois certaines methodes de rapatriement qui sont fondees en droit
et certaines qui ne le sont pas. L 'auteur suggere que la meilleure faron
d'initier ce rapatriement est par une declaration des droits Autochtones en
vertu de !'article 35(1) de l'acte constitutionel, 1982. L 'auteur propose que
certaines mr!thodes en vue d'assurer la restauration de la culture Autochtone
pourrait, avec le temps, aller au-dela du cadre juridique pour etre fondr!e
r!ventuellement sur des accords mutuels.

1

Sakej Youngblood Henderson, "Creating Post-Colonial Law" (Lecture at
Dalhousie Law School, 7 February 1996) [unpublished].
t B.A. (British Columbia), LLB. anticipated 1997 (Dalhousie).
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There are more ways to kill a nation, and to destroy a
people, than with physical violence. A more subtle but
effective way of doing it is to take away everything that
makes them that nation ... the tangible expression of the
2
people.

I. INTRODUCTION
Cultural artifacts are an integral aspect of Canada's First Nations'
cultures. When they are displayed in museums and public
institutions, the artifacts are alienated from the Peoples who created
them and
instead as frozen documents of Western
imperialism. This practise is a continuation of the government
assimilationist policies that have undermined the cultural autonomy
4
of First Nations since colonial times. Decontextualized, these
artifacts are separated from their original cultural significance and
interpreted as the representation of a culture that is dead or dying,
unable to speak for itself. Through these abuses the Native voice is
appropriated, denying First Nations their existence as living,
changing, creative peoples engaged in contemporary struggles.
Aboriginal healing necessitates First Nations cultural restoration, a
fundamental aspect of which is the repatriation of cultural artifacts.
Halting the continued exploitation of tradition and culture by
Western scholars and museums, repatriation restores Indigenous

2

D. Opekokew, "International Law, International Institutions and Indigenous
Issues" in R. Thompson, ed., The Rights ofIndigenous Peoples in International Law:
Selected Essays on Self-Determination (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 1989) at 5, as quoted in R. Clements, "Misconceptions of
Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural Property under Canadian Law" (1991), 49 U.
T. Fae. L. Rev. 1 at 24 [hereinafter Clements].
3
R.J. Coombe, "The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing
Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy" (1993) 6
C.J.L.J.
249 at 278.
4
Other examples of alienation from cultural traditions include the 1884-1951
outlawing of the Northwest coast Potlatch ceremony, a method for political, social
and, economic organizing. The residential school system and the Indian Act are
manifestations of assimilationist policies.
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Peoples' dignity, privacy, and identity by re-establishing control
over the further interpretation and use of their heritage. 5
Informal repatriation successes resulting from ad hoc guidelines
are uncertain and unpredictable. While consensus-based repatriation
would be ideal, its limited record of success renders it
unsatisfactory at present. Instead, Canadian courts must articulate
and extend a legal obligation to museums and public institutions,
ensuring the repatriation of Native artifacts. The Anglo-Canadian
common law system has proven to be inadequate where this aim is
concerned. Accordingly, this article argues an Aboriginal right to
First Nations' cultural artifacts should be declared through section
6
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which would take into account
the cultural significance of the artifact to the Native Peoples. A firm
constitutional and Aboriginal right could ensure the repatriation of
artifacts currently in the possession of museums and public
institutions to the source Nations by whom they were created. In
time, Canadian society will gain awareness of the need for
repatriation, and an agreement-based approach to cultural
restoration could be achieved.
II. DEFINITION

The "cultural artifacts" referred to in this article encompass those
items created by a group of Aboriginal Peoples which are significant
cultural representations elementary to the group's self-knowledge.
A cultural artifact is defined broadly because the test used to define
its significance focuses on a given object's necessity to the
restoration and preservation of the culture from which it originated.
This is not a strict test, for each First Nation must ultimately
determine for itself what it considers unique and definitional of its
own cultural existence. Referred to in this discussion, however, are

5

The use of the term "repatriation" rather than the museum terminology of
"restitution," is deliberate. While the former applies by definition to people, the
latter is used for objects. It is hoped that the development of this article, and in
particular the assessment of the Native world view, will demonstrate that cultural
artifacts are considered integral to Aboriginal culture in so many ways as to elevate
their significance above being important simply as "objects."
6
ComtitutionAct, 1982, s.35(1) being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (u.K.),
1982, c.11 [hereinafter Constitution Act].
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tangible culturally significant objects such as ceremonial masks,
feast dishes, totem loles, burial boxes, and the human remains of
Aboriginal Peoples.

Ill. FAILED REPATRIATION ATTEMPTS AND A
PROPOSED SOLUTION

Canadian case law on the repatriation of Native artifacts is sparse;
the failed repatriation claims that have been litigated are
demonstrative of the difficulty in using a European-based legal
system to achieve First Nations' goals. One such case dealing with
an unsuccessful attempt to repatriate cultural artifacts is Mohawk
Bands of Kahnawake, Akwesasne and Kanesatake v. Glenbow-Alberta
8
Institute. During the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics, the Glenbow
Museum in Alberta assembled fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth
century North American Indian artifacts from around the world for
their exhibit entitled The Spirit Sings. A group of Mohawk from the
Kahnawake reserve in Quebec objected to the Glenbow Museum's
display of a false face mask that had been owned by the Royal
Ontario Museum (ROM) for sixty-six years. Explaining that the
mask was possessed of great spiritual power and religious
significance, counsel for the plaintiffs remarked that its display in
The Spirit Sings was "equivalent to putting the Catholic Host in a
. show. ,,9
stnp
When both the ROM and the Glenbow refused to keep the mask
out of the exhibition, the Mohawk sought an injunction to block its
display. Shannon J. of Alberta's Court of Queen's Bench initially
allowed an interim injunction but ultimately reversed his decision
when the respondents produced evidence proving that the items
had been on display at a number of museums for the past thirty
years. Shannon J. found that the Mohawks failed to prove sufficient
suffering as a result of the exhibition. He held that as the masks and

7

Excluded from this discussion are the stories, songs, dances, and ceremonies that
clearly also comprise a vital aspect of a culture based on oral tradition, and are
considered by First Nations as "property."
8
Mohawk Bands of Kahnawake, Akwesasne and Kanesatake v. GlenbowAlberta Institute, [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 70 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter Mohawk].
9
R. Clements, "Misconceptions of Culture: Native Peoples and Cultural
Property under Canadian Law" (1991), 49 U. T. Fae. L. Rev. 1at10.
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other items in question had been on display at a number of
museums, there was no urgency in having it removed from public
display. The plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm if the mask is
displayed in view of the fact that it has been previously displayed,
and that the
had never objected in the past to the display
0
of this mask. The Mohawk people also applied for a permanent
injunction to regain ownership of an assortment of artifacts on
display in the Glenbow Museum, but this application was also
refused. Today, the false face mask, one of the artifacts in dispute,
remains in the ROM' s collection.
Attempts to "battle" for Native artifacts within the "form" of
the Anglo-Canadian legal system have failed thus far because the
cultural significance of the objects has not been taken into account
by courts deciding the various claims. Importantly, this is due to
the separation of the objects from their respective source cultures. A
successful solution for repatriation within the Canadian legal
framework is dependent upon the artifact being re-invested with its
cultural significance and integral importance to the culture of its
Peoples of origin. Once this significance is restored, an object can
be proclaimed an integral part of Aboriginal life and a right to
repatriate the artifact under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act
will be litigiable. To understand the significance artifacts assume in
First Nations' cultures necessitates an exploration of the cultural
differences manifested in the European and Aboriginal world
•
11
views.

IV. THE ABORIGINAL WORLD VIEW
In Canada, attempts to assess the traditional Aboriginal world view
are limited by the non-Aboriginal capacity to adequately
comprehend this unique perspective. As Sakej Henderson astutely
observes, "rou can never understand another world view in a foreign
2
language." In his account Dancing With A Ghost: Exploring Indian

10

Supra note 8 at 71.
To establish a polarity between the colonizer and the Aboriginal peoples is not
to pit the systems against each other in furtherance of the "warfare of consciousness,"
but to gain an understanding of the difference so that we can then begin to work on
it, see Henderson, supra note 1.
Supra note 1.
11
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Reality,

13

criminal lawyer Rupert Ross explains that "our two
cultures are ... separated by an immense gulf, one which the EuroCanadian culture has never recognized, much less tried to explore
14
and accommodate." While Anglo-European intellectual history
began with the Mediterranean world view, classically enunciated by
Plato and Aristotle, the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada originated in
Asia, and imported their nomadic existence to this continent. Ours
is an absolutist system, inspired by empirical philosophy,
sovereignty, an artificial state and positive law; theirs can best be
characterized as a circular, spiritually integrated, communal world
view.
1. A Circular Vision of Existence

Ross states that "we [non-Aboriginal people] see ourselves on a
road, moving forward, progressing down some linear track that
15
promises constant improvement and discovery." He then posits
the western European conviction contends that one is born to
continue travelling down an infinitely changing road, while
Aboriginals conceptualize their destiny as the cyclical repetition of
previous events and experiences. Ross further describes this cyclical
process as:
walk[ing] in the footsteps of all who had gone
before ... to take in effect their place on the slowly
revolving wheel of eternally repeating existence ... and
define their lives not as occupying the new ground of
their own discoveries, but as revisiting ground already
16
occupied by all their ancestors.

The metaphorical shape of existence from an Aboriginal perspective
is circular rather than linear, revolving not evolving. Native people
tap conceptually into the communal and repeating past, present and

13

R. Ross, Dancing with a Ghost: Exploring Indian Reality (Markham: Reed
Books Canada, 1992). Ross himself is not a First Nations person, and though it may
seem bitterly ironic to be using a non-Native person's account to gain an
understanding of the Aboriginal world view, I think it appropriate because the
book was written for non-Natives to grasp the immense gulf between the two
cultures.
14
..
upra note 13 at xxu.
15
Ibid. at 89.
16
Ibid. at 89-90.

s
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future, through land and surroundings, but also through their
cultural artifacts. Cultural objects that are of historical and aesthetic
interest to non-Aboriginals, perpetuate the present for Native
Peoples.
Leroy Little Bear similarly characterizes this circular world view.
He contrasts the linear, occidental relationship to the world with
the Aboriginal philosophy of viewing the world in cyclical terms.
Using images to illustrate the Aboriginal perspective, he states: the
"[cyclical] philosophy is the result of a direct relationship to the
macrocosm. The sun is round, the moon is round, a day is a
,,17
eyel e.

2. A Spiritual Outlook on Life
While many non-Aboriginals conceive of the universe in a strict
scientific sense, Native people have traditionally held a pantheistic,
18
supernatural view of the universe. For Native people there are
supernatural explanations for natural phenomena and the behaviour
of creatures in their midst. From this point of view, effective human
intervention or control in the universe is minimal, except through
supplication to the spirit world. Ross further explains this notion: "I
don't think it is open to doubt that in Native approaches to life
there is an interplay between the spiritual and physical planes which
19
is central to the individual characteristics of both."
3. A Holistic World View
Aboriginal Peoples perceive the human, natural, and spiritual worlds
20
as a totality that influences every aspect of daily life. Little Bear
supports this notion, contrasting the linear and monotheistic
philosophy of Western cultures with an Aboriginal cyclical
philosophy "that does not lend itself readily to dichotomies or
21
categorization, not to fragmentation or polarizations."

17

Leroy Little Bear, "Aboriginal rights and the Canadian 'Grundnorm"' in J. R.
Ponting, Arduous journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1986) at 244.
18
Ross, supra note I 4 at 51.
19
Ibid at 49.
2
Clements, supra note 2 at 6.
21
Supra note 17 at 246.

°
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4. Communal Rights
For the most part, the Native world view is expressed in terms of
communal rather than individual rights. The concept of "property"
in Native terms then, also relates to relationships that are far
broader than notions such as the exclusivity of possession and the
right to alienate property that dominate the Anglo-Canadian legal
tradition. Within the Native world view there is not a sense of
private property, but rather concepts of property that recognize the
interdependence of communities, families, and nations. Any sense
22
of ownership does not preempt the rights and privileges of others.
These doctrines are woven into the very essence of Aboriginal
cultural artifacts. In the words of Onandaga Chief Owen Lyons:
[t]ribal customs and religious ordinances are
synonymous. All aspects of life are tied to one totality.
Artifacts are equally important: for example, wampum
(beads made from shells) is artwork, religious object,
historical document, and representation of current
.
23
existence.

When cultural artifacts are understood in terms of this Aboriginal
world view, it becomes clear that these items are not merely
historical documents; they are communally shared symbols of
contemporary culture, imbued with spirituality. Hence one
interprets these artifacts as manifesting a united and cyclical whole,
which integrates humankind, nature and the spirit world. In
Aboriginal culture these aspects cannot be separated, and the
concept of a cyclical existence is inherent in the cultural artifact
itself. Naturally connected to the peoples who created it, the
artifact is an extension of their existence as a holistic, spiritually
associated peoples, and a tangible manifestation of the human,
natural, and spiritual worlds.

22

Little Bear, supra note 17 at 284.
B. Blair, "Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums Battle
for Artifacts" (1979) 7 Am. Indian L. Rev. 125 at 127.
23
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V. THE NECESSARY INCLUSION OF THE NATIVE
WORLD VIEW

When judges decide Aboriginal claims in the absence of an
understanding or consideration of this Native world view, the claim
is destined to fail. This is exemplified in the case of R. v. jack and
24
Charlie. The appellants in this case are members of the British
Columbia Coast Salish First Nation. The charges brought against
them were for hunting and killing a deer out of season off the
reserve. Defence counsel argued that the deer in question had been
shot in preparation for a religious ceremony, which involved the
burning of fresh meat to satisfy the spirits of the ancestors by
serving food. Defense counsel explained that the essence of the deer
would be transmitted through the smoke to the essence of the
ancestral spirit. However, Beetz J. determined that "there was no
evidence that the use of defrosted raw deer meat was
25
sacrilegious." By ignoring the Aboriginal world view, the Supreme
Court of Canada assumed that the spirit of the deer could be
separated from the flesh. The judge's failure to appreciate the
differing Aboriginal view resulted in upholding the conviction of
the Native appellants.
Like the deer meat in the jack and Charlie case, so too are
Aboriginal cultural artifacts seen without recognition of their
cultural significance, when the Native world view is left out of the
conceptual framework. With the world view separated from the
object, the integral and integrated aspects of the artifacts to the
First Nations culture are ignored, and replaced with, "the range of
western beliefs that define intellectual and cultural property lawsthat ideas can be easily separated from expressions, that expressive
worlds can be abstracted from the meaningful worlds in which they
26
figure, to circulate as the signs of unique personality. " What
happens to our conceptualization of the object, and in turn to the
source cultures we connect with the object, when they are placed
under glass in museums or similar institutions?

24

R. v. jack and Charlie, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332. [hereinafter jack and Charlie].
) Supra note 24 at 334.
26 Coombe, supra note 3 at 285.

2-
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VI. ARTIFACTS ON DISPLAY: REPERCUSSIONS
FOR THE SOURCE CULTURE

Two major consequences of extracting an artifact from the source
culture and putting it on display in a public, non-Aboriginal
institution, are:
i) the artifact is disconnected from its holistic involvement and
significance in the larger source culture. The Native world view is
separated from the artifact, and replaced instead by a European
conceptualization of art that justifies the artifacts presence in the
museum and makes repatriation difficult.
ii) the source culture is deprived of any recognmon of present
contemporary existence, and relegated to an ahistorical suspension
in time. Their culture is thus appropriated, and Native Peoples
denied their own past and contemporary present.
1. The Conceptual Shift Between Artifact and Art
Upon seeing a cultural artifact on display in a museum or public
institution in Canada, the viewing public assumes that the artifact
had historical significance, and presently has only aesthetic and
educational value. When viewing artifacts in a museum
environment, the jump from artifact to art is an easy and
unconscious transition in thought, which most people are unaware is
happening. Identifying this transition is a crucial step toward
understanding both the difficulty and the necessity of repatriating
27
cultural artifacts to their creators.

27

Within the property law system of the Anglo-European tradition, property
regimes are divided into a "continuum" located between the poles of "cultural
property" and "intellectual property." While this may perhaps be seen as a sliding
scale of definition, in the sense that objects may in fact move over time from one
realm into the other, it is also possible to conceive of this as a hierarchy of property .
Copyright and trademark laws apply only to intellectual property, thus cultural
property is not given the guarantees of such protection. It remains closer to the
"ethnographic specimen" side as distinct from the finer arts of intellectual property,
see B. Sherman, "From the Non-Original to the Aboriginal: A History" in B.
Sherman and A. Strowe!, eds., Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law
(Toronto: Clarendon Press, 1994).
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The display of an artifact leads to a "recognition of the
greatness of tribal works, ... thereby bestowing on those objects the
status of 'art' in place of their former lowly designation as
28
ethnographic specimens. "
Cultural artifacts that become
Indigenous art are commodified, objectified, and reified for
purposes of collection, observation, and display. The artifacts are
disconnected from the Peoples who created them and from the
spiritual or religious significance the object has in society. Emptied
of meaning, the artifact becomes instead one individual's aesthetic
object, allowing it to be imbued with European concepts of art and
thus deserving of the same possessive notions that justify housing all
great works of art as contributions to the universal culture of
humankind.
Art exhibited in galleries is seen to exemplify human creativity
that transcends the limitations of time and place, while
commenting on the human condition. As R. J. Coombe suggests,
[W]hen non-Western objects fully pass from the status of
authentic artifact to the status of art, they ... enter into a
'universal' history ... [t]hey become part of a human
cultural heritage ... rather than objects belonging to the
29
'cultures.'

Williams makes a similar point:
Works of art and sculpture, artifacts, great monuments
and temples have been prized throughout history as being
of significant importance. This has been so, not only
because of their aesthetic worth, but also because they
30
represent the talent and endurance of man.

A universal collection of human cultural heritage "must be well
preserved to ensure that future generations can see and marvel at
the accomplishments of their own epoch and those that came
31
before." It was during the twentieth century that this concept of
universal patrimony was born.

28

Supra note 3 at 257.
Supra note 3 at 258.
30
S. A. Williams, The International and National Protection of Movable
Cultural Property (New York: Oceana Publications, 1978) at 258.
31
Ibid
29
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i. Tracing the Notion ofa Universal Collection
In 1939, the International Council of Museums undertook a study
that pronounced the conservation of artistic and cultural heritage to
be in the interest of all nations in their collective capacity. From this
perspective, countries possessing significant cultural and artistic
wealth are seen simply as repositories for objects generally
32
benefiting all humankind.
The 1954 Hague Convention far the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict established a mandate
seeking to give protection to all property (irrespective of origin or
ownership) viewed as being of importance to the cultural heritage of
all peoples. Damage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever meant damage to the cultural heritage of all
humankind, since "each people makes its contribution to the culture
of the world," and each country is simply a custodian of its
33
treasures for the world at large.
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property was the first multinational convention aimed at
protecting cultural property from destructive threats in times of
peace. At this international forum it was declared that, "it is
incumbent on every state to protect the cultural property existing
within its territory,
the dangers of theft, clandestine
excavation and export."
The 1972 Paris Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage also stressed the national selfregulation and protection of cultural artifacts, noting that "the
deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural
heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all
35
the nations of the world." The state custodian was thus required
to preserve and protect art.
These theories of housing and protecting works of art were
developed in accordance with European aesthetic standards and

32

Cultural Rights as Human Rights: Studies and Documents on Cultural Policies
(Paris: UNESCO Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1977) in
Williams, ibid. at 53 [hereinafter UNESCO].
33
Williams, ibid. at 34.
34
Williams, supra note 30 at 54.
35
Ibid at 54.
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have been applied to Aboriginal artifacts. The artifacts have been
decontextualized in museum displays, making it all the more easy
for non-Aboriginal value systems to operate and go unchallenged.
The fact that these value system are often so deeply ingrained as to
be unrecognizable and therefore difficult to challenge only
exacerbates the problem. This problem is part of the reason
repatriation attempts have failed.

2. Cultural Assimilation and Voice Appropriation
A further consequence of displaying artifacts is that the culture
behind the work is denied a contemporary and dynamic present,
thus being further assimilated into the dominant culture through
appropriation of cultural voice. 36 Under the guise of protection,
Native cultures are frozen in time and rendered ahistorical.
Museum exhibits create the perception of vanishing Native
traditions and cultural destruction. Native artifacts are appreciated
in terms of their historical value and not as the ongoing expressions
of Peoples engaged in contemporary struggles. Native cultural
identity is " ... extinguished, denied, suppressed and/or classified,
37
named and designated by others." Artifacts collected and housed
in museums are valued as authentic artifacts of a dying culture and
disappearing race. Joanne Cardinal-Shubert, an Aboriginal curator
and anthropologist, makes a similar argument with reference to the
38
Glenbow exhibit, which was at issue in the Mohawk case. The
Glenbow exhibit, she explains, "took ceremonial reliquae out of
their contexts in community life, portrayed them as lifeless objects
and pushed the notion that Native culture was dead, wrapped up,
39
over and collected." The displaying institution projects an image
of Native "Indianness," while the living human beings with Native
ancestry are treated as dead, dying, vanishing, or victimized, and in
need of others to speak on their behalf.
The Aboriginal experience has been described as the "experience
of everywhere being seen, but never being heard; of constantly

36 For an excellent summary of the "appropriation of voice" debate that centers
around the telling of aboriginal stories, see S. Godfrey, "Canada Council Asks
Whose Voice is it Anyway?" Globe and Mail, (21March1992) Cl.
37
Coombe, supra note 3 at 272.
38 upra note 8.
39
Cardinal-Shubert, as quoted in, Coombe, supra note 3 at 277.

s
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being represented, but never listened to, being treated like an
40
historical artifact rather than a human being." Aboriginal
contemporary culture is being spoken for, and this appropriation of
voice constitutes the final stage of colonialism and cultural
41
genocide. Colonized peoples suffer the loss of control over many
aspects of their society, including the ability to control the
information being transmitted about their own culture (which may
be inaccurate or plainly wron15) and the ability to carry out their
4
religious or spiritual practices.

i. Denial ofReligious and Spiritual Practices
The Zuni Pueblo in New Mexico had stolen from them wooden
carvings of their war gods which later were sold to American
museums. 43 The carvings were used in an annual religious ceremony
and after left placed, undisturbed, on Zuni land to fulfill their
religious purpose. The museums housing these artifacts varnish
them each year, although, as objects of religious significance, this
tampering is offensive and sacrilegious to the group from which
they were taken. These, as many ceremonial artifacts on display in
museums, are of vital importance to a specific Native community
and are integral elements of its religious ceremonies. Without the
items the ceremonial rites cannot be exercised. The objects are
necessary for the religious survival and maintenance of cultural
integrity: "failure to perform the rituals rips at the fabric of Native
American culture and inevitably leads to the destruction of the
44
cultural integrity of individual North American societal groups."
The pattern of denying Natives their religious or ceremonial
practices has been repeated in Canada. One example, shared by
Margaret LaBillois, an elder of the Eel River Bar First Nation,
concerns the storage in a Fredricton museum of ancestral remains.
40

41

Ibid. at 279.

Commission on Human Rights, Draft Principles and Guidelines far the
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, Report on the Forty-Sixth Session,
[1994] 4 C.N .L.R. 17 [hereinafter Draft Principles].
42

Obviously it is not simply the presence of the object in the museum. There are
also many social factors that are at work in forming the general society's perception
of aboriginal artifacts as "art." For a broader reference to this, see Sherman, supra
note 27 at 122.
43 See Clements, supra note 2 at 6-7.
44
Blair, supra note 23.
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Unable to influence the museum's treatment of the remains, this
northern New Brunswick community could not inter the remains
and put their ancestors to rest. Dean Jacobs observes: "the thing
that non-natives don't understand is that the spirit of an Indian
doesn't die. It's an ongoing journey. When bones are disturbed and
45
removed, the journey is interrupted." The result in this case was
that Aboriginal people were robbed of ultimate control over
46
religious and ceremonial life-that of burying its dead.

VII. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REPATRIATION
One argument against repatriating artifacts from public institutions
is the need to protect and preserve artifacts for posterity in order to
educate future generations. This argument makes three problematic
assumptions: first, it implies that preservation is a desirable end;
second, that museums are better placed or more capable of
protecting Native artifacts than the source cultures themselves; and
third, that the human culture is enhanced, despite cultural
knowledge being transmitted second hand and through persons
other than those from the source culture.
The attitude that "many source nations retain cultural works
that they do not adequately conserve or display and if such works
were removed to another nation, they would be better preserved,
47
studied and exhibited" assumes preservation to be a desirable
goal. The cultural insensitivity of this presumption is illustrated by
First Nations' belief that totem poles are meant to decay, following
the same cyclical pattern of all living things.
Furthermore, the notion that Native Peoples lack the cultural
expertise and organization to deal with cultural property as a
resource is grossly paternalistic and discriminatory. It is insulting
and hardly short of racist to presume that First Nations are
incapable of protecting and caring for the products of their own
creation.

45

D. Henton, "Outrage: Native Challenge Study of Sacred Bones" Toronto Star
(26 August 1989) Al 4, in Clements, supra note 2 at 8.
46
The Canadian Museum of Civilization alone holds roughly 3000 partial or
com,,Plete skeletons in its collection, Clements, supra note 2 at 7.
4
J. H. Merryman, "Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Properry" (1986)
80 A.J.I.L. 831, as quoted in Coombe, supra note 3 at 261.
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To argue that world culture is enhanced when artifacts are
housed in public institutions, makes individual nations responsible
to the international community for the preservation of cultural
48
property situated on their territories. This prioritizes the education
of Anglo-Europeans and tourists over the education and
continuation of the Peoples to whom the artifact belongs and to
whom it is rendered inaccessible. Further, if cultural diversity
contributes to the general cultural wealth of humanity, then it
should be encouraged. The most accurate knowledge of each
unique culture is best transmitted by the original owners.
Contesting the view of a unified universal human culture is the idea
that "cultural diversity contributes to the adaptability and creativity
49
of the human species as a whole," leading to a long term benefit to
all humanity. In order to diversify and enrich the human culture
overall, Indigenous peoples should be recognized as the primary
guardians and interpreters of their cultures. Finally, one must
realize that the price being paid for the education of the dominant
culture is the destruction of the Aboriginal minority.

VIII. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
REPATRIATION

The strong social and moral arguments for repatriation, discussed
above, can be made in hopes of influencing policy choices made by
government administrations, legislatures, and ultimately the courts.
Despite their consciousness raising effect, moral arguments provide
only limited success and legal arguments surrounding repatriation
claims must therefore be explored.
In order to bring a legal claim for cultural artifacts, Native
people must use the dominant language or "form" of the AngloCanadian legal system. Consequently, they are forced to use
categories that are antithetical to their needs. Recognizing the
problem in using the dominant Canadian system to argue an
Aboriginal claim, it is of little surprise that what has often foiled
attempts at repatriation is the common law itself. A brief analysis of
common law principles and Aboriginal needs reveals why.
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While the Aboriginal holistic world view assumes the
integration of all aspects of life (e.g. ceremonial wampum beads
support culturally significant ideas on several planes) the English
common law system divides the world in a fashion both hostile and
foreign to Aboriginal needs, rigidly demarcating intangible works
and cultural objects. As R. J. Coombe states, "the law rips asunder
50
what First Nations people view as integrally related."
Native ownership of property, like the First Nations relationship
to the world, is holistic. Land is communally owned, and ownership
rests not in any one individual but rather belongs to the band as a
whole. 51 Native concepts of property are based on notions of
communal rights and collective ideology, where access to and use
of resources is determined by the collective interests of society as a
whole; in contrast, the non-Aboriginal view is based on individual
possessory rights. The Aboriginal concept of property incorporates
relationships that are far wider than the exclusivity of possession
and rights to alienation dominating the Anglo-Canadian system.
The idea of communal tide is found among the various
conceptions of property held by Canada's First Nations.
The rights belong to members of Aboriginal
communities because they hold membership and these
52
rights cannot be alienated.

The Anglo-European property law system, however, is predicated
on the necessity of identifying and isolating an individual owner in
resolving ownership disputes. Therein lies the difficulty in applying
this legal system when ownership does not lie with the individual,
. h t h e commumty.
. 53
b ut wit
On a perusal of the dichotomy between communal ownership
and individual ownership, it might be assumed that the repatriation
issue can be framed in common law terms by the museum's refusal
to return "stolen property," giving rise to a cause of civil action in
conversion. The First Nation could also employ the rule against
transferring greater rights in property than one has: nemo dat quod
note 3 at 2 69.
Little Bear, supra note 17 at 245.
B. Ziff, Principles ofProperty Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) at 282.
53
Another inherent problem, that is perhaps less pronounced because more
nebulous, is that of the use of the term "ownership." Communal cultural property is
guarded or cared for, but not necessarily "owned" in the western sense of the word.
50 Supra
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non habet. The individual who transfers title in an artifact to a
museum could be argued to have done so without the consent of all
the affected members of the band; and due to the communal
ownership of property, this Native individual would have given
greater rights in the object than he or she had to offer.
Thus, it might appear that communal ownership rights of
personal property can be protected by the common law umbrella.
However, there is the problem of the evidentiary burden required
by Anglo-Canadian common law edicts. One problem of proof in
assessing and determining the legality of a museum's possession of
Native artifacts is the necessity of proving through witnesses the
theft or transfer. Since the vast majority of any eyewitnesses to the
theft would be long dead, the sources of proof the First Nation
would rely on is oral history, and expert testimony. But the courts
have demonstrated a reluctance to receive oral testimony, 55 despite
the significance oral tradition has within First Nations'
. •
56
commumnes.
Finally, the issue of good title must be explored. The common
law always presumes title in the landowner or person in possession
57
of the artifact. Museums who possess cultural artifacts would
therefore be presumed to have good title. Again, problems of proof
would make it difficult to overcome that presumption. Repatriation
claims within the common law framework could also be defeated
by limitations of actions and the doctrine of laches. Therefore,
effective arguments for repatriation must be sought outside the
common law framework.
IX. EFFECTING CHANGE
The shortcomings revealed in using common law arguments to
effect repatriation beg the question whether these difficulties can be
surmounted, and if so, how. The common law system is fluid by
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nature, and has the ability to evolve to suit society's needs. Change
in the surrounding social structures, tendencies, and beliefs
eventually reaches the courts and effects modification there.
Transforming social policy creates conceptual shifts that are
eventually reflected in our laws.
The example of matrimonial property legislation demonstrates
this progression and reform over time. Changes in the common
law, equity, and finally legislation in the form of the Married
Woman's Property Act of 1883, exemplify how the common law
progressed over time, reflecting changes in society by changes in the
58
law. The common law reflects the ongoing dialectic between
society and the legal system; these are mutually informing
processes, sensitive to and receptive of change. The caveat to be
noted here, however, is that this change can be very slow, as
demonstrated by the torpid evolution of the laws surrounding
married woman's property. The following is an analysis of some of
the forces of social change and pressure that one can hope will exert
some impetus for innovation in the legal system. These are some
solutions to repatriation that have been reached outside of the
sphere of this country's courts.
1. Land Claims Settlements

The possibility of including the requested artifacts for
repatriation in land claim settlements has been established in
connection with the Nisga'a Band of northwestern British
Columbia. 59 One problem with this approach is that it is slow and
those in control do not want relinquish control. The Nisga'a
settlement serves as an example: "It's doubtful that any pieces will
be moved to British Columbia until the Nisga'a build facilities
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J. D. Johnston, "Sex and Property" (1972) 17 N.Y.U.L. 1033 at 1044.
P. Gessell, "Nisga'a Get Museum Pieces in Land Claims Settlement" Ottawa
Citizen (17February 1996) A12. As reported in the Ottawa Citizen:
59

The Canadian Museum of Civilization is transferring the
ownership of 'a few hundred' aboriginal artifacts to the Nisga'a
tribal government as part of this week's tentative land-claims
agreement with the British Columbia band. The Nisga'a deal is
different from most demands for artifacts acquired legally or
illegally by museums, in that the cultural artifacts are linked
directly to a land-claims agreement.
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equipped to preserve the artifacts and more people are trained to
60
care for the fragile materials." Moreover, there is some speculation
as to whether the current agreement will settle the dispute, as the
Nisga'a have been arguing their land question for almost a century
now.

2. Legislation
In 1990, the United States Congress enacted the Native American
Grave Protection and Repatriation Act, mandating the return of a
61
large number of culturally significant objects. The Repatriation Act
is a prodigious effort of Congress to return Native American
cultural property, requiring all federal agencies to compile an
inventory of Aboriginal skeletal remains and funerary objects in
their collections, and to make these inventories available on request.
If a request is made for the return of these items by a group
establishing sufficient cultural affiliation, such items are to be
. . 1y returne d .62
exped Itlous
3. Bands Working Independently with Museums
Subsumed under this heading are partial solutions to repatriation
that are less adversarial than litigation. Cooperative efforts have
been employed to develop management, access, use, and custodial
policies between the museums housing the objects and the First
Nations to whom they belong. For example, the Task Force Report
on Museums and First Peoples, advanced the idea of a partnership
relationship between Canadian museums and First Nations Peoples
63
"guided by moral, ethical and professional principles." An instance
of a museum putting this method into practice is observed in the
Museum of Anthropology (MOA), Vancouver, British Columbia.
The MOA has a lending system to promote access to the artifacts,
whereby ceremonial items such as feast dishes can be "borrowed"

60
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by the source culture for the duration of a particular event or
celebration. In addition, the museum consults with aboriginal
peoples about the display, care, and cultural significance of the
64
artifact.
A problem with cooperative efforts between museums and First
Peoples is the limited control relinquished to the First Nation.
Although some museums may adopt access and lending practices,
the terms of such arrangements will be dictated by the museum.
While museums are often willing to "share" the artifacts, they are
reluctant to relinquish control over them. "We're not emptying out
the vaults," says George MacDonald, the MOA's executive director,
"what we're doing is sharing with them, and pieces will move back
65
and forth. "
One successful repatriation reached through independent work
with a museum, is the Canadian Museum of Civilization's return of
the Starlight Bundle, a sacred relic of the Sacree people of Alberta,
in 1989. The board of trustees of the National Museums of Canada
had voted to return the bundle because "of the importance of the
bundle to the band in conducting tribal ceremonies, its intended
use in educating young Sacrees about their heritage, and the band's
66
assurances that the bundle would be well-preserved."
Problems with the court system, including cost, time
consumption, and the adversarial nature of the litigation process, all
render consensual solutions as better suited to the repatriation goal.
Unfortunately, however, so many of these consensus-based claims
have failed: "clearly the success rate of non-legal claims for
restitution is very low, no matter whether the claim is based on
religious or kinship grounds, proprietary or spiritual rights,
67
wrongful taking or wrongful display." The story of the Big Bear
Spiritual Run is an example of an unsuccessful non-legal attempt to
repatriate cultural artifacts. Jim Thunder, an Alberta Cree, ran from
Edmonton to New York City in an effort to persuade the American
Museum of Natural History to return to the Plains Cree a calico-
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wrapped sacred bundle (containing a grizzly bear paw, a sweetgrass
braid and tobacco plug). The bundle had belonged to Plains Cree
Chief Big Bear until his death in 1888. The museum had been given
the bundle fifty years earlier by an unnamed Native, with the
instructions to "keep it well." The museum refused to return the
bundle and argued that Thunder's claim could not be
68
substantiated.
There are many forces at work within contemporary Canadian
society that are raising the issue of repatriation and apprising
Canadians of the current debate. While we have seen a few
successful attempts, one is also reminded of how ineffective and
uncertain these policies can be. Most importantly, for Aboriginal
people, there is a pervasive element of urgency underlying the
repatriation debate. First Nations cultures are being eroded. This is
evidenced by the intolerable conditions found on many reserves
and the over-representation of Native people in the penal system.
The urgency thus eliminates the option of using societal pressure to
force the recognition of a legal right to the artifacts; it simply takes
too long. The recognition for the right to repatriation must flow
from the legal system to society. One cannot wait any longer for
the "form" to fit before engaging in the "battle." By necessity, the
claims for repatriation must be advanced in Canadian courts.
If Aboriginal claims to cultural artifacts are recognized under
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, the common law form and
the English common law rules of property can be abandoned. 69
Once the courts have articulated a constitutional right to First
Nations cultural artifacts, the groundwork for successful
repatriation claims on a consensus basis will have been established.

68
69

Henton, supra note 66.
Bell, supra note 63 at 465, states:
one should not assume that Canadian courts will not reformulate
the rules of property to accommodate an aboriginal perspective.
Despite its firm roots in the private property rationale, Canadian
law is unique in that it often seeks to find a compromise between
liberal ideologies that promote the rights of individuals and
collective concerns that promote the welfare of the communities.
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X. AN ABORIGINAL RIGHT TO CULTURAL
ARTIFACTS

The notion of an Aboriginal right to cultural artifacts is also based
on a human right to culture; and while Aboriginal right to the
former has not been established, human rights are firmly
entrenched in popular beliefs and international human rights law.
1. A Human Right To Culture

The concept of a human right to culture was solidified as early as
the 1948 Universal Human Rifbhts Declaration, which recognized a
"right to culture" in Article 27. In 1966, the UNESCO Declaration of
the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation stated in Article
1:
[E]very people has the right and duty to develop its
culture. The document states that 'culture is the essence
of being human,' and the declaration identifies the 'right
to freely participate in the cultural life of the
•
) 71
commumty.

If, as the UNESCO conclusions state, "the first task of life is to live,
and one of the principle functions of culture is to enable people to
maintain and perpetuate life," 72 then surely denying access to the
material objects of that culture is a violation of this basic human
right. Support for this was again expressed in the 1994 Draft
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples. This draft deals primarily with the flow of
indigenous people's heritage across international boundaries, but the
principles remain the same: " ... the right and the duty of
indigenous peoples to develop their own cultures and knowledge
,,73
systems.
The right of Indigenous people to control the dissemination of
their culture and all its integral aspects should be accorded
constitutional protection by a declaration of the courts under
section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. The Constitution provides
a bridge between the two world views; the rights-discourse suits the
70
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Anglo-Canadian framework, and the recognition of the right
provides Aboriginals with a method of repatriation.

2. A General Characterization of Aboriginal Rights
Aboriginal rights arising out of a declaration under section 3 5 are
"additional and special rights, over and above the rights enjoyed by
74
all citizens in Canada." They arise by operation of law, and do not
75
depend on a grant from the Crown. The nature and content of an
Aboriginal right is determined by what the organized Aboriginal
76
society regards as an integral part of their culture, and is not
limited to a use having been exercised, or occupation established,
since time immemorial. All the evidence need show is that it had
been in effect for a sufficient length of time to become integral to
77
the Aboriginal society. Canadian courts have identified Aboriginal
rights as sui generis, and it has been stated that their unique nature
has made them "difficult, if not impossible to describe in
7
traditional property law terminology." s They are communal rights,
although each member of the community has a personal right to
79
exercise them and are intimately connected to pre-sovereignty
Aboriginal practices.so Certain activities may be regarded as
Aboriginal rights if they formed an integral part of the traditional
1
Native life prior to sovereignty.s
What is protected are rights and not habits. They must
be considered by the Aboriginal people who claim them
to be so important to their society, so fundamental to
their basic beliefs and relationships, so much a part of the
significant and distinctive characteristics of their
indianness, that they serve to define what makes an
2
indian an indian. s
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In assessing an Aboriginal right the court considers its
relationship to the cultural and physical survival of the claimant
group. In R. v. Sparrow the right to fish was recognized as an
Aboriginal right not only because the salmon fishery is valuable as a
food source, but also because of its role in the system of beliefs,
social practices, and ceremonies of the Musqueam people. This
practise forms an integral part of their distinctive culture and is not
simply an incidental habit:
The English common law imposed a correlative duty
upon the Crown to protect from unjustifiable
interference and impairment, the Aboriginal
community's right to engage in those Aboriginal customs
and practices traditionally associated with the lands they
83
occupied and used.

3. The Extinguishment Of Aboriginal Rights
It has been firmly established under Canadian law that "the laws of
a conquered country continue in force, until they are altered by the
84
conqueror." In St. Catharines Mi!lingv. The Queen the Privy
Council stated:
[T]he acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown did
not, in itself, extinguish the right of the Aboriginal people
to continue their traditional customs [and] practices in a
85
manner integral to that indigenous way of life."

The onus of proving that the sovereign intended to extinguish the
Native title lies on the Crown. The court will demand strict proof
86
of extinguishment, which must be clearly and plainly established
Implicit extinguishment or adverse dominion do not make Native
title give way, and there is no "theoretical basis for the view that a
87
right which is not used can be treated as abandoned after 1846."
Although "as a common law doctrine, albeit a fundamental one, the
doctrine of Aboriginal rights can in principle be overridden or
modified by legislation passed by a competent legislature, in the
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absence of constitutional barriers." As long as an Aboriginal right
had not been completely abrogated prior to the Constitution Act, it
is seen by the courts as constitutionally entrenched.
4. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982
Aboriginal rights are "recognized and affirmed" in the Canadian
polity by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and guaranteed
in section 35(4). The approach for interpreting section 35(1) is
derived from general principles of constitutional interpretation: "the
nature of 35(1) suggests that it be construed in a purposive way." 89
In addition, because of its position outside the Charter, section 35 is
not subject to a section 1 analysis.

XI. THE INHERENTLY PROBLEMATIC USE OF
THE CONSTITUTION ACT: THE CONCEPT OF
RIGHTS, GROUP RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE
RIGHTS

In arguing for an Aboriginal constitutional right to cultural artifacts,
there is a problem of fitting First Nations' belief system into the
Canadian legal system. Why should Aboriginal peoples need to or
want to fit their aspirations into the dominant and imposed
constitutional framework of section 35 of the Constitution Act?
Why should Aboriginal claims have to use the "masters" language
and conceptual apparatus to dismantle the "master's" house?
Applying the Constitution Act to Aboriginal claims of any type
may be problematic since the Act is predicated on a notion of
individual rights rather than communal rights. Communal rights
are traditionally very important to Aboriginal Peoples, and are "not
personal rights in the sense that they exist independently of the
community, but personal in the sense that a violation of the
communal rights affects individual members' enjoyment of those
90
rights." As the individual rights regime is dominant, sanctioned
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and elevated as the supreme law in Canada, conflicts are filtered
through its categories and conceptual apparatus.
M.E. Turpel has unapologetically critiqued the use of an
individual-rights based paradigm for arguing Aboriginal concerns.
Her comments on individual rights under the Charter can be
applied equally to section 35:
[T] he entire process and substance of constitutional
development and interpretation as the construct of a
highly legalistic, adversarial, and abstract set of doctrines
and theories which developed according to the needs of
the predominantly Anglo-European colonialists. Because
no common language other than that of the predominant
culture and legal system is available, Aboriginal people
find themselves trapped in the colonial paradigm, facing
91
the problem of 'being the doctor and the disease'

In having to rely on the constitutional individual rights
paradigm: "assistance aimed at human rights progress may actually
92
be part of the oppression cultural peoples experience."
Rather than depend on an Aboriginal right, Henderson
identifies the need for a new vision of law and knowledge, which
recognizes that society has many different cognitive systems
93
operating within it. The individual rights model may deny the
existence of a difference between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
cultures, and thus act as a political tool of cultural hegemony. To
characterize a right as Aboriginal may simply serve to create a
polarity between cultures, and not work to resolve the underlying
divides.
The risks inherent in formulating an appeal for
recognition of cultural difference in terms acceptable to
the rights paradigm of the Canadian constitution are
high ... the imperative to rethink
interpretation in
4
light of cultural difference is obvious.
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XII. RESOLVING THE USE OF A RIGHTS-BASED
PARADIGM

In arguing for an Aboriginal right to cultural property, and in light
of the inherently problematic use of rights-based discourse for
resolving Native issues, it may be preferable to rely on the
aforementioned notion of the ongoing dialectic between the courts
and society. If the courts can uphold a repatriation claim on the
basis of an Aboriginal right to cultural property, this in turn can
work to influence the public's acceptance of the need to repatriate
artifacts. Over time the public will influence the legislatures and
other mechanisms that react to and create social policy. Progressive
legislation (like the United State's Repatriation Act) can ultimately
take over as a preferred avenue for repatriation. The use of the
rights-based paradigm is therefore only necessary to generate an
impetus for repatriation. If an Aboriginal right to cultural artifacts is
enunciated by non-elected, independent judges, it may well infuse
the social conscience and render the future use of the Constitution
and its emphasis on individual rights unnecessary.
An example of this interplay can be drawn from the Mohawk
case. 95 The Court's refusal to allow repatriation generated public
discourse, which brought to light the importance of repatriation to
Native Peoples. The Assembly of First Nations invited museum
curators from Canada and around the world to Ottawa in
November, 1988, to discuss the display of Native artifacts. This
meeting led to the creation of a joint task force between the
Assembly and the Canadian Museums Association, which was
dedicated to developing guidelines for the appropriate handling of
Indigenous peoples remains and artifacts. Although the request for
the return of cultural artifacts was ultimately refused, the mere act
of litigating the Mohawk case resulted in the issue entering the
forum of public debate.

XIII. AN ABORIGINAL RIGHT TO CULTURAL
PROPERTY: FITTING THE TEST

The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to render a comprehensive
definition of aboriginal rights that embraces all the possible uses of
95
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the term. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that
Canada is moving toward a broader definition of Aboriginal rights,
which are not dependent on the Crown granting or recognizing that
such rights exist.96 Rather, inherent rights are presumed to be sui
generis; preexisting legal rights that are independent of creation or
acts of recognition. That the courts have chosen not to place limits
on the types of rights categorized as Aboriginal rights suggests that
the content of Aboriginal rights will continue to be tested on an ad
hoc basis and could be expanded to incorporate any number of
rights recognized as being integral to the culture of the First
Nation.
Thus far, Canadian law has recognized an Aboriginal right to
fish, hunt, and hold title to land. The time has now come for a
declaration of an Aboriginal right to bury their dead, dance their
own masks, feast from their own dishes, and revere their own
ceremonial reliquae. In short, the time has come for an Aboriginal
right to cultural artifacts.
Having explored the Native world view, the importance of
artifacts to the First Nations cultures is clear. Some cultural artifacts
are so central to the Aboriginal culture as to be easily discerned as
integral to the culture; they are the culture, and are therefore
important to the cultural survival of the First Nations. This has been
so since time immemorial, and has been neither clearly nor plainly
extinguished. Adverse dominion by public institutions housing the
artifacts does not in itself extinguish the inherent Aboriginal right
to those artifacts. When Aboriginal Peoples are deprived of access
to their culture, the courts should regard this as a prima facie
violation of their Aboriginal right.
XIV. ASPIRATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Undeniably, museums once played a vital role in the preservation of
Native American culture. Museums have acted as havens for the
safe-keeping of artifacts from zealous missionaries. Today, however,
the continued possession of Aboriginal cultural artifacts by
museums and public institutions contributes to the assimilation of
First Nations into the colonizing culture, resulting in the
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annihilation of the First Nations' cultures. Repatriation of cultural
artifacts from non-Aboriginal public institutions to the source
Nations is therefore desirable. Repatriation attempts that set claims
to the cultural artifacts in the common law form are doomed to fail
because the legal system (as exemplified by problems of proof and
private ownership), makes no allowances for the fundamentally
different condition of First Nations. Non-legal solutions based on
mutual agreement for repatriation are the answer. To ensure success
and certainty in repatriation claims that do not involve the court
system, it is imperative that an Aboriginal right to cultural artifacts
be articulated by the courts. Given the integral nature of the
artifacts to the First Nations' cultures, support for which is found in
a contemplation of the Aboriginal world view, the Sparrow test for a
declaration of a section 35(1) Aboriginal right to cultural artifacts is
easily achieved.
Until complete repatriation is realized, the following temporary
improvements to the current situation of museum display are
proposed:
i) When "protection" is considered necessary, it must be mutually
agreed to and cannot be forced upon the First Nation.
ii) The free and informed consent of the original owners should be
an essential pre-condition of any agreements made for the
recording, study, use or display of indigenous people's heritage.
iii) Under no circumstances should objects be publicly displayed,
except in a manner deemed appropriate by the peoples
concerned.
These temporary improvements will inspire greater public awareness
of the problems surrounding the possession of Aboriginal cultural
artifacts. However, full-scale repatriation can only begin when an
Aboriginal right to determining cultural priorities and identifying
what is integral to the culture and its survival, is firmly declared by
the courts.

